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This paper rephrases the extended version of the 1956 Solow model, in which he
assumed population growth as a function of income. This version of the model implies that
convergence should arise in demographically homogenous samples of countries, and that
economic growth should be sensitive to demographic growth. The predictions of the
extended Solow model are tested in demographic clubs derived by regression tree
analysis by using cross-sectional and time series unit root tests. The results give support
to convergence within the clubs and, in particular, divergence between the clubs. Hence,
the extended version of the Solow model may explain the convergence controversy in the
post-war growth empirics.
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1 Introduction
In his famous 1956 paper, Solow provided a model that then served as the
theoretical basis for the current growth empirics, the main topic of which has
been the disparity between the convergence, predicted by the model, and the
divergence, exhibited in samples of heterogenous countries. In addition, Solow
provided an extension assuming that the demographic growth rate, which was
constant in the basic model, is a function of per capita income (Solow 1956).
Although this closed-form assumption gives no microeconomic explanation for
population growth, it is in line with the later models, which have found these
explanations in human capital accumulation, in the gender wage gap, and in
technical progress (Becker et al. 1990, Galor and Weil 1996, Galor and Weil
2000).
In this paper, we study the implications of the extended Solow model. Since
this model argues that population growth rises or falls together with income, yet
maintains the diminishing returns, it predicts convergence only if demograph-
ics is controlled for. Because demographic variables change slowly, attempts to
control them at the annual basis have turned to be less successful (Dasgupta
1995). Hence, we apply an alternative strategy by partitioning the sample to
homogenous clubs; the extended Solow model then predicts that the underlying
tendency for convergence, generated by diminishing returns, should manifest
itself in these clubs, but economic growth should vary from club to club. There-
fore, the extended version of the Solow model captures both the convergence
(within the clubs) and divergence (between the clubs) and may thus explain
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the convergence controversy, much discussed in the post-war growth empirics
(Temple 1999).
Earlier studies derive convergence clubs on the basis of common history
(Baumol 1986), geographical location (Maddison 1994), or mutual trade (Ben-
David and Loewy1998). In this paper, we identify demographic convergence
clubs directly from the data by applying the regression tree method suggested
by Durlauf and Johnson (1995). In our case, this method generates four de-
mographic clubs. It turns out that these clubs have a natural interpretation in
the theory of demographic transition, corresponding to the main stages of it,
namely the stages of increasing, peaking, decreasing, and levelling-o¤ population
growth, through which economies proceed in the course of their development
process. The regression tree analysis also gives club-typical economic growth
rates, exhibiting huge divergence between four demographic clubs or stages.
In the previous literature, the convergence hypothesis has been evaluated
by applying two main methods, namely cross-sectional ?¡convergence tests
and unit root time series tests. This literature …nds absolute or unconditional
?¡convergence across relatively homogenous countries, such as the 48 contigu-
ous US states or 73 regions in seven European countries (Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1992), or 47 Japanese prefectures (Sala-i-Martin 1996). On the other
hand, no such convergence is exhibited in any large heterogenous sample of
countries (Mankiv et al. 1992). Using unit root tests for the richest 25 coun-
tries from 1960 to 1985, Ben-David (1996) suggested that the trade-based clubs
exhibit convergence, whereas Bernard and Durlauf (1995) …nd no evidence on
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convergence in 15 industrial countries from 1900-1987.
There has also been much discussion on the appropriate model speci…cation
in the unit root tests. Li and Papell (1999) show that the failure to reject the no
convergence null can be due to a structural change in economic growth. They
re-examine the Bernard and Durlauf (1995) data and …nd breaks around the
WWII, and evidence on convergence if structural breaks are allowed. Recently,
Strazicich et al. (2004) report …ndings of two structural breaks in OECD data
from 1870-1994. Cunado and Pérez de Garcia (2006) …nd evidence on con-
vergence in 43 African countries, when they allow for breaks in the trends.
Michelacci and Za¤aroni (2000) propose that the level of output can exhibit
“long memory”so that the standard tests fail to reject the null of a unit root
despite of mean reversion. They conclude that there is absolute convergence
across OECD countries. Phillips and Sul (2003) allow for the heterogeneity in
the speeds of convergence, in the growth rates for technical progress, and in the
initial incomes but do not …nd any evidence on convergence for a sample of 120
countries.
In this paper, we perform both the absolute ?¡convergence tests and time
series unit root tests in di¤erent speci…cations for the whole sample and for
each club separately using the Penn World Table 6.2 data on 85 countries from
1960-2003 to evaluate the predictions of the extended Solow model. The re-
sults provide some support for the convergence hypotheses within clubs. This,
together with the great divergence in economic growth between clubs, implied
by the regression tree analysis, show that the extended Solow model can shed
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considerable light on the current convergence-divergence debate.
The outline of the paper is the following. Section 2 rephrases the extended
Solow model and discusses its implications for economic growth and conver-
gence. Section 3 partitions the data to demographic clubs by regression tree
analysis and Section 4 gives the convergence results within the clubs by apply-
ing cross-sectional ?¡convergence tests and unit root time series tests. Section
5 discusses the growth di¤erentials between the clubs and Section 6 closes the
paper.
2 The Implications of the Extended Solow Model
In his famous 1956 paper, Solow introduced a model where population grows
at a constant rate ? and the per capita production function ? = ?(?) exhibits
positive but diminishing returns ? 0(?) ? 0, ? 00(?) ? 0. Since the accumulation
of per capita capital is _? = ??(?) ¡ (? + ?)?, the growth rate of the per capita
capital becomes
?? =
_?
?
=
??(?)
?
¡ (?+ ?)? (1)
in which ? ? 0, and ? ? 0 stand for the depreciation and the saving rates
respectively. The derivative of the growth rate ?? with respect to ? becomes
???
??
=
? [? 0(?) ¡ ?(?)??]
?
? 0? (2)
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The sign of (2) depends on the sign of ? 0(?) ¡ ?(?)?? which is negative due to
diminishing returns. Diminishing returns generate decreasing growth rates and
the initially poorer countries grow faster than the initially richer countries. This
is the convergence result.
In his “Extensions”, Solow (1956) suggests that population growth ? is a
function of the per capita income ? which, in turn, is a function of per capita
capital ?, so that one can write ? = ?(?) with ?0(?) ? 0 (?0(?) ? 0) indi-
cating that population growth rises (falls) as a function of per capita income.
Because the e¤ective depreciation rate [?(?) ¡ ?] ? of this model is non-linear it
may have multiple steady states, the existence of which implies that di¤erences
between countries are persistent. However, population growth is decreasing and
demographers project that almost all developing countries will reach the western
standards in the middle of this century (United Nations 2005). Hence, at least
from the demographic point of view, the assumption of a single steady state is
most appropriate.
Inserting ? = ? (?) in (2) gives
???
??
=
? [? 0(?) ¡ ?(?)??]
?
¡ ?0 (?) 7 0? (3)
Equation (3) shows that the sign of ?????? now relies on two separate e¤ects
namely on the diminishing returns and on the change in population growth
(demographic e¤ect). Diminishing returns always generate a negative e¤ect but
the demographic e¤ect can be positive or negative so that the sign of ??????
depends on the dominance between these two e¤ects. Hence, the extended
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Solow model predicts that the underlying tendency for convergence, generated
by diminishing returns, may be overshadoved by the demographic e¤ect, but
reappears if demographics is controlled for.
There are two strategies to control for this: Either the demographic variables
can be inserted into the growth regressions or the sample can be partitioned to
demographically homogenous sub-samples or clubs (Sala-i-Martin 1996). Be-
cause population grows as a function of slowly accumulating capital its annual
changes are neglible, making the former strategy less e¢cient. Instead, the club-
strategy is suitable in identi…cation of the long-lasting demographic e¤ects on
economic growth.
3 Demographic Clubs: the Regression Tree Analy-
sis
The extended Solow model itself does not give any theoretical implication how to
…nd the demographic clubs. Therefore, we identify them directly from the data
by using the regression tree analysis as applied by Durlauf and Johnson (1995).
Regression tree analysis is a data sorting method that partitions the range of
regressors into the (approximate) level sets of the regressand, producing club-
speci…c values to the latter. The algorithm chooses both the splitting regressor
and the split value to generate the largest possible decrease in the deviance of
the model calculated as the sum of the deviances of the regressor in the sub-
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samples.1 Once the number and the limits of the clubs are identi…ed in terms
of the regressors, the sample of countries can be partitioned accordingly.
The algorithm that applies a linear model
?????? = ?+ ?? + ??? + ??? (4)
in which ? (the average annual population growth rate) and ?? (the change
in ? over the period), whereas the regressand is ?????? (the average annual
growth rate of the per capita ??? ).2 The economic data spanning from 1960
to 2003 are at annual level, and come from Summers, Heston, and Aten, version
6.2 (2006). The demographic data are in …ve years period and come from The
United Nations (2005). The highest AIDS prevalence countries Lesotho, South-
Africa and Zimbabwe, the OPEC countries, and the East-European countries
are excluded from the sample.3 In this way we can collect data for a sample of
85 countries.
The …rst split is in terms of ?? and the split value is ¡0?195 (cf. Figure
1). Countries with change in population growth larger than ¡0?195 constitute
the …rst demographic club.4 There are 29 such countries in the sample, the
1 Figure 5 in Appendix ? shows the regression tree.
2 The average annual population growth is measured by the net reproduction rate giving
the number of female children per woman. This measure is insensitive to migration that has
played a considerable role in population growth in some countries. Since the extended Solow
model provideds no theory of migration, we want to eliminate its role.
3 We exclude Rwanda and China as well, the former because the mass murders there con-
siderably decreased the accuracy of the demographic data, the latter because the population
policy sets this country in a speci…c position among countries. The demographic data for
Taiwan is replaced by that of South Korea. The economic data for Taiwan is available in
Summers, Heston, and Aten (2006).
4 Note the extended Solow model assumes population growth as a function of the level of
the per capita income which, in the long run, is sensitive to ??????. Hence, the estimated
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Figure 1: The four demographic clubs and the club-speci…c annual economic
growth rates.
club-speci…c average annual economic growth rate in this club is 0?65%. The
algorithm splits the countries with ?? ? ¡0?195 by regressor ? to those where
? 7 1?835. Countries in Club ?? (22 countries) have ? ? 1?835 with economic
growth rate of 1?76%. Countries with ? ? 1?835 are further split to two clubs
by ?? . Club ??? has 10 countries with club-speci…c growth 3?95% and Club
?? has 24 countries with the club-speci…c economic growth rate of 2?59% an-
nually. The calculations of the model deviances show that the largest decrease
is associated to the …rst split, but once the number of the clubs is four, the
decrease in deviance becomes marginal. Therefore, we conclude that the right
number of demographic clubs is four.
Figure 1 and Table (1) summarize the results of the regression tree analy-
coe¢cients in (4) may su¤er from endogeneity but endogeneity has no impact on the standard
deviances applied by the algorithm.
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Club Memb. Regressor and Value Deviance GROWTH N DN
Root 85 184?100 1?87 1?77 ¡0?40
? 29 ?? ? ¡0?195 23?740 0?65 2?07 0?30
?? 22 ?? ? ¡0?195? ? ? 1?835 32?250 1?76 2?22 ¡0?78
??? 10 ? ? 1?835? ?? ? ¡1?035 18?900 3?95 1?56 ¡1?33
?? 24 ? ? 1?835? ?? ? ¡1?035 9?781 2?59 1?13 ¡0?50
Table 1: The regression tree results. The table reports the splitting variable
and the split value, the standard deviation in each club, and the average growth
rate of the per capita income, the average population growth and its change.
sis. To interprete these results, note that countries in Club ? experienced an
acceleration in population growth and countries in Club ?? were charachterized
by high population growth, whereas population growth in Club ??? decreased,
being already relatively low in Club ?? . Hence, facing the theory of demo-
graphic transition with rising and falling population growth, one can say that
countries in Clubs ? ¡ ?? were at the successive stages of the demographic
transition, characterized by acceleration, peak, deceleration, and levelling-o¤ in
population growth respectively. Figure 2 illustrates the approximate location
of the demographic clubs in demographic transition. The poorest countries are
in Clubs ? and ??, the well-known East-Asian Tigers are in Club ??? and the
Western countries (and India) are in Club ?? . Appendix ? gives a complete
list of countries in each club.5
5 There is one possible misallocation, namely Luxemburg, that was located to the poorest
club, Club ?, because of its high population growth rate which was mainly due to immigration.
Although net reproduction rate that is relatively resistant to annual immigration, persistent
immigration may still be re‡ected by higher net reproduction rates if the immigrants come
from high fertility cultures and adapt to the local fertility behavior only with a lag. The rest
of the analysis is performed without Luxemburg.
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Figure 2: Demographic Transition and its stages (Clubs ? ¡ ?? ).
4 Convergence Within
4.1 Absolute ?¡Convergence
The two convergence concepts considered in this paper are the cross-sectional
absolute ?¡convergence, and the time series convergence, measured by unit root
tests. To run the former, let ????0 stand for the log of per capita income in coun-
try ? at time ?0. A sample of countries is said to exhibit absolute ?¡convergence,
if in the following model
Model 1: (????0+? ¡ ???? ) ?? = ?+ ?????0 + ???? (5)
the estimated ? is negative implying that the initially poorer countries grow
faster than the initially richer countries (Barro and Sala-i-Martin 1992, and
Mankiw et al. 1992). Model 1 has been criticized on several grounds. Islam
(1995) suggests that instead of pooled cross-sectional estimates, panel methods
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Sample Model 1
? ?-test prob.
All 0.34 2.08 0.04
Club I -0.25 -1.16 0.26
Club II -0.99 -2.34 0.03
Club III -1.16 -2.08 0.07
Club IV -0.64 -3.30 0.004
Table 2: The regression results for Model 1
are more appropriate to control for country-speci…c …xed e¤ects. Lee et al.
(1997) suggests that country-speci…c coe¢cients for initial incomes should be
allowed as well. We apply the basic model (5) since the number of observations
in clubs is low. Hence, we run Model 1 for the sample of all countries and each
club separately; the results are provided in Table 2.
The estimated ? in the sample of 84 countries is positive and signi…cant, i.e.,
the sample as a whole exhibits divergence, a result that is con…rmed in most
large samples of heterogenous countries (Mankiw et al. 1992, for example). In
contrast, the estimated value for ? is negative in all clubs, but signi…cant only
in Clubs ?? and ?? . A closer examination of Club ??? shows that from 1960
to 2003 many countries have changed their positions in this club; countries that
were initially poor are now rich and vice versa. Hence, there is no divergence
but merely “leapfrogging”in this club. Figure 3 shows the regression diagrams
for each club.
4.2 Unit Root Tests for Convergence
To run the unit root tests, let ¹?? stand for the average per capita income in
the sample and ???? ¡ ¹?? for the di¤erence of the income in country ? from
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Figure 3: The absolute ?¡convergence tests in Clubs ? ¡ ?? .
the sample mean. If the estimated autoregressive term ?? in ¢(???? ¡ ¹??) =
?? (????¡1 ¡ ¹??¡1) is negative, then the income in country ? converges to the
sample mean. In addition to the autoregression, the income gap may depend
on time. Convergence may also be conditional in the sense, that even if the gap
???? ¡ ¹?? decreases, it never vanishes completely. Hence, to derive an unbiased
estimate for ??, the augmented Dickey-Fuller test for an individual country
should be formulated as
¢(???? ¡ ¹??) = ?? + ???? + ?? (????¡1 ¡ ¹??¡1) +
?X
?=1
????¢????¡? + ?????
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in which ??, ???? and, ?? are the constant, the trend, and the autoregressive
coe¢cient respectively,
P?
?=1 ????¢????¡? is the sum of the lags, and ???? is the
identically independently distributed error term. Again, country ? is said to
converge if the estimated autoregressive coe¢cient ?? is negative.
To generalize this test to a panel of countries, several speci…cations are pos-
sible. Im et al. (2003), suggest that to control for the heterogeneity implied
by the theoretical model (di¤erences in production functions and demography
in the extended Solow model), each country should have an individual autore-
gressive coe¢cient. Since the demographic clubs are derived to eliminate this
heterogeneity, individual autoregressive coe¢cients, if applied, would lead to
ine¢cient estimates. Hence, we are left with three possible speci…cations (Levin
and Lin 1993 and Levin et al. 2002):
Model 2 : ¢(???? ¡ ¹??) = ?? + ???? + ? (????¡1 ¡ ¹??¡1) + ????
Model 3 : ¢(???? ¡ ¹??) = ?? + ? (????¡1 ¡ ¹??¡1) + ????
Model 4 : ¢(???? ¡ ¹??) = ? (????¡1 ¡ ¹??¡1) + ?????
Table 1 shows that although sample partitioning leads to relatively homoge-
nous clubs, all heterogeneity can not be eliminated. To control for the residual
heterogeneity, Model 2 includes the trend ???? dealing with time-related factors
like di¤usion of technology. Country-speci…c trends are justi…ed only, if di¤u-
sion takes place at di¤erent pace in di¤erent countries. Table 1 shows that the
residual dispersion in ?????? in Clubs ? ¡ ??? is much larger than in Club
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?? indicating that some countries have bene…tted technological di¤usion more
than others in the former, whereas di¤usion has been symmetric in the latter.
Hence, a model with a trend is correct in Clubs ? ¡ ??? but not in Club ?? .
The extended Solow model does not discriminate between the concepts of
population and labor force. Instead, all people work equally. However, changes
in the dependency rate have been remarkable as …rst the cohort of children, then
the cohort of working adults, and …nally the cohort of retirees have swelled in
the course of demographic transition (Bloom and Williamson 1978). This slowly
changing factor may wedge country’s income from the sample mean. Because
this is not eliminated in the regression tree analysis above, it is a potential source
for residual deviance, and should be controlled for by inserting a country-speci…c
constant. The average dependency rates over the period 1960–2003 were 897,
877, 699, and 566 (per thousand workers) and their standard deviances were
103, 756, 129, and 63 in Clubs I-IV respectively, showing that the burden was
highest in the beginning of the transition and calling for a speci…cation with
constant at least in Club ??.
We run Models 2–4 for the whole sample and for each club separately. As the
pattern of serial correlation might di¤er across countries, we estimate individual
lags for each country.6 The ??? and numbers of observations are (28? 44? 1189)
for Club I, (22? 44? 929) for Club II, (10? 44? 416) for Club III, and (24? 44? 1021)
for Club IV respectively. The regression results are given in Table 3 which
6 The number of lags was tested by performig ADF-test for all countries. We started with
maximum of 3 lags and reduced the number of lags until the remaining lag(s) were statistically
signi…cant.
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Sample Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
? ?¤-test prob. ? ?¤-test prob. ? ?¤-test prob.
All
Club 1 -0.14 -1.61 0.05 -0.04 -1.36 0.09 -0.002 -1.21 0.11
Club 2 -0.19 -2.83 0.00 -0.02 0.27 0.60 0.002 0.65 0.74
Club 3 -0.13 -0.99 0.16 -0.02 -0.33 0.37 -0.004 -1.37 0.09
Club 4 -0.10 -2.10 0.02 -0.06 -2.73 0.00 -0.008 -4.94 0.00
Table 3: The regression results for Models 2–4.
reports the estimated autoregressive coe¢cient ?, the value of the ?¤¡test, and
the probability of obtaining such ?¤¡value if the ?0 was true.
The results in Table 3 indicate that Club ? converges only if a country-
speci…c …xed e¤ect and trend is allowed as was suggested above. The same is
very much true for Club ??. Club ??? , however, does not exhibit convergence
with any one of the possible model speci…cations. Remembering the outcome
from ?-convergence in Table 2, this is not a surprise. Club ?? , consisting mainly
of industrial countries, seems to exhibit convergence in its strict notion. The
rate of convergence, however, is small indicating that it would take 87 years for
the remaining income gap to be halved. In other words, it appears that these
countries are relatively homogenous and “converged”already.
Our results indicate that the demographic transition is among the important
determinants of growth as suggested by the model. It is not, however, the only
determinant of the convergence, as our estimation results point out. Countries
that are in the same stage of demographic transition may have other di¤erences
as in the terms of di¤usion of technology, the dependency burden, the rate of
literacy or the rule of law. Based on our results it, however, seems that if
the advances in demographic, institutions and technology do take place, these
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laggards will eventually reach the industrialized countries. First, they need to
exhibit convergence within their own club.
4.3 Caveats
One cause for concern is the notion of convergence used in this study. It was
proven by Evans (1998) that if countries grow exogenously with the same rate of
growth then for convergence for all members of the panel to hold the di¤erence
between the individual series ???? and the mean value for the series across all
members at each point in time ¹?? = 1?
?P
?=1
???? should be stationary. 7 Instead of
analyzing each pair of countries separately the convergence hypothesis can be
tested with a panel of countries by testing whether
(???? ¡ ¹??) = (?? ¡ ¹?) + ? (????¡1 ¡ ¹??¡1) + ???? ¡ ¹??, (6)
is stationary under the assumption that ?? = ? for all ??
Lets’assume that the cross-sectional dependence of ???? across ? can be spec-
i…ed by the two-factor model:
???? = ?? + ???? (7)
where ?? is a time-varying common stochastic component and ???? is the country-
speci…c IID disturbance term (Maddala and Wu 1999, Kutan and Yigit 2004,
Huang 2005). The most general form of the data generating process (DGP) to
7 See also discussion in Lee et al. (1997) and in Pedroni and Yao (2002).
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be considered here is the one with …xed-e¤ects ?? and country speci…c growth
rates ??
??? = ?? + ??? + ??????¡1 + ??? (8)
According to Evans (1998), with common technology
¡
?? ¡ ¹?
¢
= 0 and with
?? = ? for all ? demeaning yields
(??? ¡ ??) = (?? ¡ ¹?) + ? (????¡1 ¡ ??¡1) + ??? ¡ ¹??? (9)
We note that assuming, as Evans (1998) does in his proof, that countries
share the same technology might not be true having our data in mind. When
testing for convergence, assuming that
¡
?? ¡ ¹?
¢
= 0, when it is not the case will
bias the estimator of ? and the estimator of the rate of convergence8 . Moreover,
under demeaning of this kind the cross-sectional dependence of error terms must
be speci…ed by the two-factor form in equation (7). When this is not the case
demeaning does not remove all the cross-sectional dependence and the estimator
is biased. Hence, from these remarks we suggest that the test for convergence
might be subject to biases.
5 Divergence Between
Table 1 reports the average annual economic growth rates for each club showing
that this rate was lowest in Club ? (0?65%) and highest in Club ??? (3?95%).
8 Lee at al. (1997) argue that due to di¤erences in growth rates the mean of ?? is across
countries would be subject to a downward bias.
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Because Club ? also had the lowest average initial income ($1564 constant 2000
international), it lagged the other clubs and its income in 2003 was only $2022.
In Club ???, for example, the per capita income in 1960 was $3199 but increase
to $16148 in 2003. Hence, in 1960, the income in Club ? was 50% of that in
Club ??? but only 20% in 2003 showing the huge divergence of incomes between
these two clubs as Club ? fell behind and Club ??? leaped ahead. Also Club
?? su¤ered from bad economic performance but the richest Club ?? proceeded
well and the incomes in the whole world diverged to a great extend. Figure 4
summarizes the economic performance in the four clubs.
Figure 4: The level of per capita GDP in 1960 and 2003 in Clubs ? ¡ ?? . The
average annual growth rates are given for each club.
To discover the demographic side of the world income division, note that the
average annual population growth rate over the period 1960–2003 was highest in
Clubs ? and ?? (2?07% and 2?22%). Because in 1960, the income in Clubs ? and
?? was 40% and 62% of the world average, but decreased to 19% and 48% in
2003, one can say that an ever larger number of people enjoyed an ever smaller
share of world incomes, as was maintained by Quah (1996). An interpretation for
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this bi-polarization was in demographic transition that kept population growing
in the poorest countries in the lowest stages in this transition.
In the future, countries proceed in the demographic transition and reach the
subsequent stages and clubs and, according to the predictions of this analysis,
start to grow at the rate that is typical to those clubs. In 1960, countries in
Clubs ? ¡ ??? were all equally poor. In 2003, only the countries in Club ???
had become remarkably richer. A similar leap ahead is also possible for the 46
countries in Clubs ? ¡ ??, which show a large potential for convergence in the
future.
6 Discussion
In his 1956 paper, Solow provided a model that predicted convergence among
countries, a result that was not con…rmed by empirical research. Solow also
provided an extended model assuming that population growth is a function of
income such that it …rst rises and then falls as is implied by the demographic
transition. The extended Solow model predicts convergence only if demograph-
ics is controlled for, and that the economic growth varies along with demographic
growth. If demographic variables are controlled for by partitioning countries to
demographic clubs, then the extended Solow model predicts convergence within
these clubs and divergence between them.
In this paper, we have divided a large sample of countries to four demo-
graphic clubs by applying the regression tree method and provided convergence
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cross-sectional ?¡convergence and unit root time series convergence tests pro-
viding some support to convergence within the clubs. On the other hand,
the club-speci…c economic growth rates exhibit great dispersion thus provid-
ing strong support to divergence between the clubs. Hence, the extended Solow
model sheds considerable light to the current convergence debate and makes the
post-war empirical results more conceivable.
In the future, countries move forwards in the demographic transition. Many
poor countries with high population growth experience a considerable decrease
in it thus entering Club III , in which catch-up of the formerly richer countries in
Club ?? becomes possible. As demographic transition gets completed, all coun-
tries reach mature demography and enter Club ?? within which convergence is
exhibited. Hence, after intricate transitional phases, the extended Solow model
suggests that all countries ultimately converge each other.
References
Barro, R. J., and X. Sala-¬-Martin (1992): “Convergence,” Journal of
Political Economy, 100(2), 223–251.
Baumol, W. J. (1994): “Multivariate Growth Patterns: Contagion and Com-
mon Forces as Possible Sources of Convergence,” in (Baumol, Nelson, and
Wol¤ 1994).
Baumol, W. J., R. R. Nelson, and E. Wolff (eds.) (1994): Convergence
of Productivity: Cross-National Studies and Historical Evidence. Oxford Uni-
20
versity Press, Oxford, U.K.
Becker, G. S., K. M. Murphy, and R. Tamura (1990): “Human Capital,
Fertility, and Economic Growth,”Journal of Political Economy, 98(5), S12–
S37.
Ben-David, D. (1996): “Trade and Convergence Among Countries,”Journal
of International Economics, 40, 279–298.
Ben-David, D., and M. B. Loewy (1998): “Free Trade, Growth, and Con-
vergence,”Journal of Economic Growth, 3, 143–170.
Bernard, A. B., and S. N. Durlauf (1995): “Convergence in international
output,”Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, 97–108.
Bloom, D. E., and J. G. Williamson (1998): “Demographic Transitions and
Economic Miracles in Emerging Asia,”World Bank Economic Review, 12(3),
419–455.
Cuñado, J., and F. Pérez de Garcia (2006): “Real Convergence in Africa
in the Second-Half of the 20th Sentury,”Journal of Economics and Business,
58, 153–167.
Dasgupta, P. (1995): “The Population Problem: Theory and Evidence,”Jour-
nal of Economic Literature, 33, 1879–1902.
Durlauf, S. N., and P. A. Johnson (1995): “Multiple Regimes and Cross-
Country Behaviour,”Journal of Applied Econometrics, 10, 365–384.
21
Evans, P. (1998): “Using Panel Data to Evaluate Growth Theories,”Interna-
tional Economic Review, 39(2), 295–306.
Galor, O., and D. N. Weil (1996): “The Gender Gap, Fertility, and
Growth,”American Economic Review, 86(3), 374–385.
(2000): “Population, Technology, and Growth: From Malthusian Stag-
nation to the Demographic Transition and beyond,”American Economic Re-
view, 90(4), 806–826.
Huang, H.-C. (2005): “Diverging evidence of convergence hypothesis,”Journal
of Macroeconomics, 27, 233–255.
Im, K. S., M. H. Pesaran, and Y. Shin (2003): “Testing for Unit Roots in
Heterogenous Panels,”Journal of Econometrics, 115, 53–74.
Islam, N. (1995): “Growth Empirics: A Panel Data Approach,” Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 110, 1127–1170.
Kutan, A. M., and T. M. Yigit (2004): “Nominal and real stochastic con-
vergence of transition economies,” Journal of Eomparative Economics, 32,
23–36.
Lee, K., H. Pesaran, and R. Smith (1997): “Growth and Convergence
in a Multi-Country Empirical Stochastic Solow Model,”Journal of Applied
Econometrics, 12(4), 357–392.
22
Levin, A., and C.-F. Lin (1993): “Unit Root Tests in Panel Data: New
Results,”University of California at San Diego, Economics Working Paper
Series No. 93-56.
Levin, A., C.-F. Lin, and C.-S. J. Chy (2002): “Unit Root Tests in Panel
Data: Asymptotic and …nite-sample properties,” Journal of Econometrics,
108, 1–24.
Li, Q., and D. Papell (1999): “Convergence of internatioanl output Time
series evidence for 16 OECD countries,”International Review of Economics
and Finance, 8, 267–280.
Maddala, G., and S. Wu (1999): “A Comparative Study of Unit Root Tests
with Panel Data and a New Simple Test,”Oxford Bulletin of Economics and
Statistics, Special Issue, 61, 631–652.
Maddison, A. (1994): “Explaining the Economic Performance of Nations,
1820-1989,”in (Baumol, Nelson, and Wol¤ 1994), chap. 2.
Mankiw, G. N., D. Romer, and D. N. Weil (1992): “A Contribution to
the Empirics of Economic Growth,”Quarterly Journal of Economics, 107(2),
407–437.
Michelacci, C., and P. Zaffaroni (2000): “(Fractional) beta convergnece,”
Journal of Monetary Economics, 45, 129–153.
Pedroni, P., and J. Y. Yao (2002): “Are China’s Post-reform Provincial
Income Levels Fiverging?,”Baker Institute Working Paper.
23
Phillips, P. C., and D. Sul (20023): “The Elusive Empirical Shadow of
Growth Convergence,”Cowles Foundation Discussion Papers No. 1398.
Quah, D. T. (1996): “Twin Peaks: Growth and Convergence in Models of
Distribution Dynamics,”Economic Journal, 106, 1045–1055.
Sala-i Martin, X. X. (1996): “The Classical Approach to Convergence Analy-
sis,”The Economic Journal, 106, 1019–1036.
Solow, R. M. (1956): “A Contribution to the Theory of Economic Growth,”
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 70, 65–94.
Strazicich, M. C., J. Lee, and E. Day (2004): “Are Incomes Converging
amond OECD Countries? Time Series Evidence with two Structural Breaks,”
Journal of Macroeconomics, 26, 131–145.
Summers, R., A. Heston, and B. Aten (2006): “The Penn World Table
(Mark 6.2): Center for International Comparisons of Production, Income and
Prices at the University of Pennsylvania,”.
Temple, J. (1999): “The New Growth Evidence,”Journal of Economic Liter-
ature, 37, 112–156.
United Nations (2005): World Population Prospects. The 2004 Revision. New
York.
A Countries and Clubs
I
24
Argentina, Benin, Bolivia, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad, Co-
moros, Congo, Ivory Coast, Ethiopia, Gambia, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-
Bissau, (Luxembourg), Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mozambique, Nepal, Niger,
Pakistan, Senegal, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Uruguay, Zambia.
II
Cape Verde, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Sal-
vador, Ghana, Honduras, Jamaica, Jordan, Kenya, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraquay, Peru, Philippines, Syria, Tunisia, Turkey.
III
Barbados, Brazil, Hong Kong, Korea Rep., Mauritius, Singapore, Sri Lanka,
Taiwan, Thailand, Trinidad&Tobago.
IV
Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France,
Greece, Iceland, India, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, U.K., United States.
B Some Additional Material
25
Figure 5: The regression tree. The spliting variable and its split value, and the
value of ?????? in each club reported.
Figure 6: The decrease in the deviance of the sample as a function of the number
of clubs.
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Figure 7: The average growth rate regressed against the log of the initial income,
the whole sample.
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